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ABSTRACT 
One of the major strengths of the U.S. Army conventional force, and its doctrinal 
methods, is the ability to conduct operational and tactical maneuver out of contact with 
an enemy force.  This allows the U.S. to decide the time, place, and conditions of contact.  
Under this system national, strategic, and operational intelligence systems generate, 
analyze, and disseminate intelligence to maneuver units.   
When major conventional operations conclude, or in operations where they never 
take place, conventional forces transition to Stability Operations and Support Operations 
(SASO).  Conducting SASO operations generally requires extensive interaction with, and 
conducting operations among, a local populace.  The necessary physical interaction with 
a local populace causes two significant problems for conventional forces: traditional 
intelligence assets (national, strategic, operational) are largely irrelevant to the operations 
U.S. forces conduct, and interacting with a local population whenever outside of a FOB 
affects the actions of the population.  In military operations other than conventional 
combat, intelligence must be generated from the lowest possible tactical level, something 
conventional forces are not organized or equipped to do.  Proliferating Shadow Tactical 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) Platoons throughout Army Brigade Combat Team’s 
(BCTs) subordinate battalions will enable commanders to gather the tactical intelligence 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND  
Despite the technological advances the military has experienced since the 
Vietnam War, soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines today are facing similar challenges in 
Iraq and Afghanistan to those that troops faced almost 40 years ago.  Operations 
Enduring and Iraqi Freedom have served to direct our armed forces’ attention to 
conducting counter-insurgency operations, something that conventional forces have not 
faced on a large scale since Vietnam.  One byproduct of this transition away from 
training for and executing standard conventional operations to training for and fighting 
active insurgencies is the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24, 
FMFM 3-24 (Draft Version)).   
This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap.  It has been 20 years since 
the U.S. Army published a manual devoted to counterinsurgency 
operations, and 25 since the Marine Corps published its last such manual.  
With our Soldiers and Marines fighting insurgents in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq, it is thus essential that we give them a manual that provides 
principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations.1 
 
FM 3-24, while still in draft from, recognizes fundamental counterinsurgency 
principles.  In an insurgency combat power alone will not insure victory.  While a 
conflict may pit insurgent against counterinsurgent forces over a variety of issues, when 
stripped bare of all political, social, and cultural contexts, the conflict is ultimately over 
who, the insurgent or the counterinsurgent, can control the local population.  The 
population is critically important to both the insurgent and counterinsurgent mainly 
because it can provide a decided advantage to the force that can control it: for the 
insurgent, the population provides resources, in the form of people, guns, and money, as 
well as allowing the insurgent forces to conceal themselves within the population; for the 
counterinsurgent, the population provides intelligence on the insurgent force, enabling the 
counterinsurgent to target the insurgent.  As Sir Robert Thompson states in “Defeating 
Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam,” “[t]he population is not 
                                                 
 1 LTG David H. Petraeus and LTG James N. Mattis, Foreword to Counterinsurgency (Final Draft), 
FM 3-24 and FMFM 3-24 (Departments of the Army and Navy: Washington, D.C., June 2006).  
2 
only providing the guerilla with his food and intelligence, but giving him perfect cover 
and concealment.  Dressed as a peasant, the guerilla, except when he is carrying arms, is 
indistinguishable from the rest of the people.  In fact, he can be both a peasant by day and 
a guerilla by night.”2   
An insurgent force embedded in a local population may give the insurgent the 
advantage in controlling the population’s behavior.  The population may not be actively 
supporting the insurgent due to their ideological belief in the insurgent cause, but rather 
may simply be intimidated by the insurgent into passively supporting, and not reporting 
to the counterinsurgent, the insurgent’s activity.  Despite the reasons behind the 
population’s support of the insurgent, active or passive due to sympathy or intimidation, 
this situation presents a significant challenge for the counterinsurgent – gathering 
intelligence on insurgents that are integrated into a non-cooperative population, or 
conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations within an urban population.  The 
challenge of attempting to interact with a local population that is supportive of an 
insurgent cause is illustrated in Figure 1.  This figure shows a counterinsurgent patrol 
approaching an insurgent controlled village and how the local populace passes 
information on the patrol’s actions to insurgents, enabling the insurgent to avoid the 
counterinsurgent patrol. 
                                                 
2 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam 
(Frederick A. Praeger Inc.: New York, 1966), 32-33. 
3 
 
Figure 1.   Information Flow to Insurgents3 
 
Further hindering the counterinsurgent is that conventional forces are not 
organized or equipped to gather intelligence from a civilian population.  They lack 
sufficient interpreter, Civil Affairs, and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) assets to 
penetrate the population and extract intelligence.4  Special Operations Forces (SOF), 
specifically Army Special Forces (SF), are best suited to combat an active insurgency 
because they are organized with organic linguists, HUMINT assets, and are small and 
self-sufficient enough to live among the local population.  Living among a local 
                                                 
3 M.D. Havron, J.A. Whittenburg, and A.T. Rambo, U.S. Army Handbook of Counterinsurgency 
Guidelines for Area Commanders – An Analysis of Criteria (American University: Washington D.C., 
January 1966), 212. 
4 The current organizational structures of the U.S. Army’s Brigade Combat Teams (Heavy, Light, and 
Stryker) will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. 
4 
population is a critical capability that can lead to earning the trust of the people, and over 
time, gain the population’s support against the insurgent forces.  
While the Army’s recent attention to using conventional forces to combat 
insurgent forces and interact with local civilian populations is a seemingly new issue, 
U.S. conventional forces have been dealing with this problem with varying degrees of 
success for decades.  Aspects of the Vietnam War, peacekeeping operations in Somalia, 
and the current Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts highlight the nature of this problem and 
that despite extensive experience, conventional forces continue to have difficulty 
gathering intelligence on belligerent groups that embed themselves in a local population. 
B. THE VIETNAM WAR 
The Vietnam War was a complex conflict that cannot be summarized in a few 
pages due to the length of the conflict, the widely disparate terrain encountered in 
different parts of the country, and the variety of forces engaged on both sides.  Despite 
this, several generalizations about the conflict are accurate – U.S. military forces 
consisted of, but were not limited to, naval ships and aircraft, a vast array of air force 
aircraft, and conventional and special operations forces, while the North Vietnamese 
generally had limited naval and air forces, and three types of ground forces: regular North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces, Viet Cong (VC) guerilla fighters, and the Viet Cong 
Infrastructure (VCI), which was a ‘shadow government’ established among South 
Vietnamese villages and hamlets with the goal of assuming power once the North 
Vietnamese won the conflict with the south.  In addition to being a politically organizing 
force, the VCI “…recruit[ed] soldiers, the political cadres collected taxes, usually in the 
form of agricultural produce, and moved goods around the country using a sophisticated 
logistical network.  They gathered information on the enemy from the peasants and 
organized surveillance along the edges of the hamlets.  They took land from the wealthy 
to give to the poor in exchange for the population’s support, and helped poor peasants 
farm their land.  Some of their duties were less pleasant, including the execution of 
government leaders and supporters.”5 
                                                 
5 Mark Moyer, “The War Against the Viet Cong Shadow Government,” in The Real Lessons of the 
Vietnam War: Reflections Twenty-Five Years After the Fall of Saigon, eds. John Norton Moore and Robert 
F. Turner (Carolina Academic Press: Durham, North Carolina, 2002), 152. 
5 
While the CIA’s Phoenix program targeted the VCI, it was the mission of the U.S. 
conventional forces to combat the NVA and VC guerillas throughout South Vietnam.  
Though there were significant differences between the leadership and strategies of 
Generals Westmoreland and Abrams, regular forces conducted patrols throughout the 
jungles and villages of Vietnam in order to find, fix, and finish the combat forces arrayed 
against them.  “To defeat this diverse force, American and South Vietnamese leaders 
identified three purely military missions: “search and destroy” (engaging conventional or 
mobile enemy units); “clear and hold” (engaging enemy territorial companies and 
guerillas); and “securing” (providing military security on a continuing basis so that the 
other pacification tasks could be carried out).6  The primary challenges that these forces 
faced were that the thickly vegetated jungles provided significant concealment and 
allowed NVA and VC forces to elude U.S. force, resulting in “[a]bout eighty-eight 
percent of the contacts were initiated by the enemy.  In other words, they attacked when 
they were ready,”7 and the necessity of searching for guerillas within local villages and 
hamlets indicated that “[t]he guerillas are now operating within the population, and this is 
the period where he can apply Mao Tse-tung’s dictum that the guerilla must be to the 
population as little fishes in water.  The population is not only providing the guerilla with 
his food and intelligence, but giving him perfect cover and concealment.”8  Whether 
attempting to engage conventional and guerilla forces in the jungle or attempting to 
distinguish guerillas from local populations, U.S. conventional forces faced the difficult 
task of gaining sufficient intelligence to accurately target the enemy forces. 
C. UNITED STATES FORCES IN SOMALIA 
United States and United Nations forces operations in the nation of Somalia, as 
part of Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and later the United Nations Operations in Somalia 
(UNOSOM II), provide another example of the challenges that conventional forces face 
operating in an urban environment against a force that integrates with an indigenous 
                                                 
6 Jeffrey Clarke, “ On Strategy and the Vietnam War,” in Assessing the Vietnam War: A Collection 
from the Journal of the U.S. Army War College, eds. Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown (Pergamon – 
Brassey’s International Defense Publishers: Washington, 1987), 68.  
7 Robert E. Morris, “Why We Lost the War in Vietnam: An Analysis,” in The Real Lessons of the 
Vietnam War: Reflections Twenty-Five Years After the Fall of Saigon, eds. John Norton Moore and Robert 
F. Turner (Carolina Academic Press: Durham, North Carolina, 2002), 392. 
8 Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam 
(Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1966), 32-33. 
6 
population.  While a majority of the military operations that garnered extensive media 
attention related to the special operations forces (SOF) actions against Aideed and his 
clan militias, there were large conventional force contributions to the mission, primarily 
in humanitarian relief efforts and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF).  The tactic of creating 
roadblocks from which to ambush UN forces and restrict their movement within 
Mogadishu led to the adoption of “increase[ing] the level of helicopter overwatch as part 
of ‘eyes over Mogadishu.’  Carried out primarily under the cover of darkness, this 
operation consisted of route reconnaissance and aerial photography for the dual purpose 
of protecting UN and U.S. troops and monitoring Somali militias’ activities.”9  
Responding to this aerial overwatch of Mogadishu, militias began relocating roadblocks 
and ambush locations to confuse UN and US forces as to their correct locations.  The 
increased use of helicopters for aerial reconnaissance was recognition of an intelligence 
gap that could not be filled by other collection assets and that in order to be effective, the 
intelligence had to be as current and accurate as possible. 
An additional challenge that forces in Somalia faced was simply navigating 
through the city – “land navigation was extremely difficult, especially due to the 
inadequacy of available maps that gave only a crude approximation of the layout of 
blocks and buildings.”10  Combined with the ever-changing militia roadblocks and 
ambush sites, U.S. and UN forces had extreme difficulty moving anywhere in the city 
without accurate and up to date intelligence.  In addition to the frequent ambush and 
mortar attacks against US and coalition forces, Somali militias began to attack QRF and 
TF Ranger aircraft with RPG-7s and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, and successfully shot 
down their first helicopter on 25 September 1993.  This led to a change in aerial tactics 
and led to increased reliance on ground forces to prevent additional aircraft losses.11 
A concrete example of the confusion and danger this lack of intelligence causes 
occurred during the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, the TF Ranger and SOF raid to 
                                                 
9 Robert F. Baumann, Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington, My Clan Against the World – 
US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994 (Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, 2003),  114-115. 
10 Ibid.,, 124. 
11 United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview – The United States 
Army in Somalia, 1992-1994 (Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 2003), 134-135. 
7 
capture Mohamed Farah Aideed.  After the initial success of the raid on Aideed’s 
compound, and the capture of 24 of his aides and militiamen, Somali forces successfully 
attacked a US UH-60 helicopter.  This drastically changed the TF Ranger mission from a 
raid to a Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission, and eventually necessitated the 
commitment of the QRF, consisting of US Rangers, US QRF, Pakistani, and Malaysian 
forces to rescue trapped US forces within Mogadishu.12  Complicating the mission of the 
QRF forces to reach the TF Ranger forces were the inaccurate maps, changing roadblock 
locations, and frequent ambushes by Somali militias.  This caused delays in the rescue 
convoy reaching the trapped Rangers and SOF personnel and hampered their ability to 
return to the UN compound.  All convoys attempting to move to the Ranger locations 
faced “[s]warming crowds, burning tires and other obstacles, and above all, ambushes at 
seemingly every turn,”13 as well as not knowing the precise locations of the various 
Ranger and downed helicopter positions around the Aideed compound.  Ultimately, 
ground forces communicated with overhead helicopters to guide them to the Ranger 
positions, as well as using trial and error along various routes to reach the Rangers and 
then return to the UN compound.14  A lack of accurate maps and an ever changing 
tactical ground situation in an urban environment necessitates conventional forces having 
a method of gathering real-time, accurate intelligence in order to maneuver forces with 
minimal interference from any opposing force. 
D. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
Conventional forces in Iraq also face similar problems distinguishing insurgents, 
criminals, and militia members from the local population, and this is exacerbated by the 
larger population centers that US forces operate in.  From April 2003 to February 2004 
the 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (2/2), a HMMWV based reconnaissance 
organization, had responsibility for the Sadr City area of northeast Baghdad, an 
approximately 75 city block slum populated by over two million Shia Iraqis.  The 
primary challenges facing 2/2 were Former Regime Elements (FRE), mainly Saddam 
                                                 
12 United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview – The United States 
Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 2003.  139. 
13 Robert F. Baumann, Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington, My Clan Against the World – 
US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, 2003.  145. 
14 Ibid.,  145-158. 
8 
Fedayeen fighters, a criminal weapons black market, and the first machinations of Al-
Sadr’s Mahdi Army.  These criminals and militia members lived in the neighborhoods 
where they operated, and were very successful at intimidating the population to not 
cooperating with the coalition forces.   
A majority of the Shia in Sadr City saw the Fedayeen fighters as tools of the 
Ba’athist regime and were readily willing to inform on their locations to 2/2.  As a result 
of subsequent coalition operations, the Fedayeen fighters were killed, captured, or fled to 
other parts of Iraq.  The criminal and militia elements were more difficult to locate and 
conduct operations against because of the support that they received from the population.  
With little support from the population, 2/2 attempted numerous raids and patrols against 
the areas where the weapons market operated.  These raids usually obtained a few 
weapons, but never identified the personnel operating the market because the criminals 
utilized an early warning system of flares, drums, and whistles any time a coalition patrol 
approached the market, giving the weapons dealers time to move a majority of their 
weapons and leave the immediate area.  The weapons market was located close to the 
geographic center of the city, and due to heavy personnel and vehicle traffic, coalition 
forces’ freedom of maneuver, both mounted and dismounted, was severely restricted. 
Coalition forces encountered similar problems identifying the members of the 
Mahdi militia as they were establishing roadblock, checkpoints, and attempting to take 
control of Iraqi government buildings.  Dressed as civilians, the militia members were 
able to blend into the civilian population as coalition forces approached and resume their 
activities once patrols were no longer in the area.  Coalition forces were also not able to 
successfully emplace observation posts (OPs) in any area of the city without being 
observed.  The Sadr City area of Baghdad is predominantly residential, and all coalition 
force movements inside the city were observed by the local population, and likely 
reported to the militia and criminal elements.  2/2 did not possess a capability to gather 
intelligence, conduct reconnaissance or surveillance without interacting with the 
population and influencing the environment they were collecting on.15 
                                                 
15 The author was an anti-tank company commander with 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry 
Regiment in the Sadr City area of Baghdad from April to October 2003, and the descriptions of events in 
that area are from his personal experiences. 
9 
 
E. ARMY TRANSFORMATION 
In contrast to SOF, conventional forces are designed, organized, trained, and 
equipped to conduct combat operations against other conventional forces.  Conventional 
forces are manpower, equipment, and logistics intensive, and do not possess the 
capability to embed themselves within a civilian population for an extended period of 
time without refit and resupply.  This lack of capability adversely impacts the 
conventional forces’ ability to reverse the advantage insurgents possess in co-opting the 
support of the population.  Further hampering the conventional force in combating an 
insurgency is the current use of large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).  The 
conventional force that reside within these FOBs generally depart them only to conduct 
combat patrols and operations, intelligence gathering, and conduct logistic resupply 
operations, thus limiting their ability to actively interact with, get to know, and 
understand the nuances of the local population and gather intelligence on the insurgent.  
The U.S. Army has recently started an extensive program to transform its 
conventional forces into modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) so that “Soldiers, 
leaders, and units [will] be extremely capable in counterinsurgency operations without 
sacrificing their ability to prevail in conventional combat.”16  These BCTs are a 
capabilities-based bridge between the late 1990s and early 2000s force, or ‘Legacy 
Force,’ which were intended to counter the Cold War Soviet threat in Europe, and the 
Army’s Future Force.  The organization changes are intended to improve their 
capabilities across the spectrum of conflict – from peacekeeping to high-intensity combat 
operations.  “Three standard BCT designs make up the maneuver power of the modular 
Army: heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs), infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs), 
and Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs). These BCTs have improved command and 
control capabilities and organic combined arms capabilities, including battalion-sized 
maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and logistic subunits.”17  Other units in the Army’s 
transformation program are Maneuver Enhancement (ME), Battlefield Surveillance 
                                                 
16 Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Version 1.0, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command, Task Force Modularity (Fort Monroe, Virginia, 08 October 2004), vii. 
17 Ibid., 6-1. 
10 
Brigades (BSB), Aviation (AB), Fires (FB), and Sustainment Brigades, though  
these organizations are not the focus of this thesis.   
These reorganized combat brigades have several new systems to increase their 
ability to operate in conventional and unconventional environments, specifically 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).  As currently structured, each BCT has an organic 
Tactical UAV platoon (TUAV), consisting of three Shadow UAVs, which is intended to 
be an observation and intelligence gathering platform for the Brigade Commander.  In 
addition to these deliberate organization changes, conventional Army units currently 
operating in Iraq are using the smaller Raven-B and other UAVs at the company and 
platoon level to improve their ability to view the battlefield around them.  The current use 
of UAVs within BCTs is growing, but not organizing UAVs at the battalion level misses 
an opportunity to further increase the ISR capabilities of the BCTs.   
When conducting conventional combat operations BCTs are able to draw 
intelligence and relevant information from a variety of higher level sources to understand 
the operational and tactical situation.  These sources include satellite imagery, U-2 
aircraft imagery, strategic UAVs like the Global Hawk and Predator, and Joint 
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and other national and strategic 
systems.  The intelligence gathered by these systems is analyzed and, and in conjunction 
with higher level operational plans, is disseminated through multiple levels of command 
before it reaches and can be acted on at the tactical level.  In a conventional conflict this 
intelligence gathering and distribution system ensures that tactical operations are 
synchronized with higher level operations, and accomplishes the strategic, operational, 
and tactical plans necessary for success.  In Stability Operations and Support Operations 
(SASO) battalions often have to operate in and amongst civilian populations, and 
therefore have a need to be able to gather and develop bottom-up tactical level 
intelligence that is immediately useful to tactical units.  In these instances, the top down 
intelligence dissemination useful in conventional operations is not responsive to tactical 
commanders, who cannot task these assets to specific areas because they do not control 
their employment.  To enable tactical commanders to operate effectively in SASO 
environments they need a dedicated ISR capability at the tactical level, specifically  
 
11 
UAVs.  Fielding UAVs to maneuver battalions in BCTs will enable all maneuver units to 
have an organic ISR capability, enhancing the ability of conventional forces to conduct 



























II. BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS 
A. ARMY TRANSFORMATION OVERVIEW 
This chapter will detail the organizational changes throughout Army formations, 
focusing on the changes at the brigade and below level.  The most important aspect of the 
changes at brigade level are the additional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) assets in the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) that will increase their ability to 
gather the bottom-up intelligence necessary for success in Stability Operations and 
Support Operations (SASO), though the current changes occur predominantly at the 
brigade level.  Organizing the ISR assets at the brigade increases the commander’s ability 
to gather actionable tactical intelligence, but by not including any additional assets at the 
battalion level, does not fully exploit the capabilities of the ISR assets.  
The Army’s current Campaign Plan is designed to increase the Army’s 
capabilities across a wide range of missions and develop a joint and expeditionary Army 
with campaign capabilities18 by relieving stress on families and soldiers, improving the 
capabilities of Army forces, redesigning conventional force units, and redefining the 
Army’s culture by focusing on the soldier and increasing joint capabilities.  A critical 
component of the Campaign Plan is Army Transformation, which will “sustain and 
enhance the capabilities of current forces while building future force capabilities to meet 
the requirements of tomorrow’s Joint Force.”19  The Army’s transformation program is 
part of a wider Department of Defense transformation plan and will ensure that the Army 
is capable of integrating its forces into the future joint operational environment.  The end-
state of Army Transformation is the Objective Force, brigade sized Units of Action 
equipped with Future Combat Systems.  The Objective Force, scheduled to begin fielding 
in 2014, will incorporate organizational and doctrinal changes to enable Army units to 
see the enemy first, understand the environment first, act first, and decisively finish the 
enemy.  Until the Objective Force is ready for fielding and employment, the Army is 
                                                 
18 Army Campaign Plan Powerpoint Presentation, available from 
http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/acppresentations/4_1.html; accessed 03 October 2006. 
19 Foreword, 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 
Operations, Army Transformation Office, 31 August 2004. 
14 
focusing on transforming the current, or Legacy Force, into the Interim Force, a brigade 
based modular force.  The goal of the transformation to the Interim Force is to enable 
conventional forces to maintain their tactical superiority in high intensity combat 
operations while improving their ability to successfully conduct other missions across the 
spectrum of conflict.  
The building blocks of Army Transformation are Units of Action (UA), brigade 
sized units that are self-contained, capable of independent operations, and have 
capabilities that are traditionally only associated with divisions.  The primary maneuver 
UAs fall into three categories: Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), Infantry Brigade 
Combat Team (IBCT), and Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).  Other Army units 
will organize into Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (ME), Battlefield Surveillance 
Brigades (RSTA), Aviation Brigades (AV), Fires Brigades (Fires), and Sustainment 
Brigades (SUST).  As part of Army Transformation traditional division and corps 
structures will also radically change.  Replacing them will be Units of Employment x and 
y (UEx, UEy), two and three-star level tailorable headquarters capable of integrating into 
joint environments and controlling several subordinate UAs.  
B. UEy AND UEx HEADQUARTERS 
In future conflicts, one UEy, a three-star headquarters, will serve the Regional 
Combatant Commanders as “the Army Service Component Command (ASCC).  As the 
ASCC the UEy is responsible for the administrative control (ADCON or Title X support) 
of all Army forces in the AOR.  The ASCC also integrates Army forces into the 
execution of theater engagement plans, and provides Army support to other services as 
directed by the regional combatant commander.”20  While responsible for allocating 
Army forces throughout a theater of operation, the UEy will also control operational 
protection, information superiority, and theater support commands that will support the 
operations of joint and Army operations throughout the theater in accordance with the 
theater regional combatant commander’s priorities.  Figure 2 shows a potential 
organization for a notional UEy. 
                                                 
20 White Paper, Unit of Employment (UE) Operations, Version 2.2, Revised Initial Draft, 05 
December 2003, 40. 
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Figure 2.   Potential UEy Structure21 
 
The UEy will be more flexible than the traditional corps headquarters in that it 
will be tailorable, scalable, capable of integrating into a joint theater headquarters, and 
will be able to select its subordinate units based on mission requirements, not just select 
entire divisional units based on existing habitual relationships.  It its role as a force 
provider to the RCC, the UEy will be able to select specific UAs based on their 
capabilities and assign them to subordinate UEx headquarters, as well as allocate other 
theater level Army units to the RCC.  
The primary tactical subordinate unit of the UEy is the UEx, a two-star 
headquarters that is the primary tactical controlling headquarters of Units of Action.  “It 
is designed as a modular, command and control headquarters for the offensive, defensive, 
and stability operations incident to major land operations….Each UEx is unique not only 
for a particular campaign, but for different phases of a campaign.”22  Figure 3 shows two 
possible UEx organizations, based on two disparate missions.  In each example the UEx 
is the controlling tactical headquarters for several UAs, as assigned by the UEy, in order 
to meet the tactical requirements as determined by the RCC.   
                                                 
21 White Paper, Unit of Employment (UE) Operations, Version 2.2, Revised Initial Draft, 05 
December 2003, 41. 
22 Ibid., 46 
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Figure 3.   Examples of UEx Organization23 
 
C. BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS 
The Army transformation goal is to reconfigure the existing 33 active component 
and 34 National Guard brigades and create 10 additional brigades (one in each of the 
active divisions) and five Stryker brigades, resulting in an end strength of 82 combat 
brigades.  The brigades will serve as modular building blocks of the Interim Force by 
allowing combatant commanders to select individual brigades, based on their capabilities 
and mission requirements, instead of relying solely on the relatively inflexible nature of 
existing divisions that have a limited capability to tailor forces to specific mission needs.  
For example, a Legacy Force armored division consisted of three armor brigades each 
composed of a combination of three armor or mechanized infantry battalions, an engineer 
battalion, a field artillery battalion, and a logistical support battalion, as well as several 
supporting brigades.  In selecting an armored division for an operation a combatant 
commander would receive the division with its three similarly configured combat 
brigades, as well as all of the supporting artillery, aviation, engineer, and support assets in 
the division.  With the Interim Force, the combatant commander has the flexibility to 
request individual brigades with vastly different capabilities.  As Figure 3 shows, the  
 
                                                 
23 White Paper, Unit of Employment (UE) Operations, Version 2.2, Revised Initial Draft, 05 
December 2003, 47. 
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RCC can structure Army forces to meet the mission requirements, ranging from several 
heavy brigades and a Stryker brigade to a mix of heavy, light, and Stryker brigades, with 
a mix of supporting brigades. 
D. THE HEAVY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM 
“The HBCT is a balanced combat organization built around a brigade special 
troops battalion (BSTB), two combined arms maneuver battalions, a fires battalion, a 
reconnaissance squadron, and a brigade support battalion (BSB),”24 and is capable of 
operating across the spectrum of conflict from high-intensity combat operations to a 
variety of stability operations.  Figure 4 shows the organizational structure of the HBCT. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Heavy Brigade Combat Team Organization25 
 
Following paragraphs will look at each of the brigade’s subordinate battalions to 
identify changes from Legacy Force brigades. 
                                                 
24 Heavy Brigade Combat Team (Ch 8), Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Vol 1, Version 
1.0, Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Task Force Modularity, Fort Monroe, 
Virginia, October 2004, 8-1. 
25 Ibid. 
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The addition of the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) is the first major 
change in a UA brigade and it serves as the controlling headquarters for several other 
units added to the brigade.  The units added to the BSTB are a Military Police (MP) 
platoon for security tasks, a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) platoon, an Area 
Network (Signal) company, and a Military Intelligence (MI) company with an Analysis 
and Integration (A&I) platoon, a Ground Collection platoon (Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT)), and a Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(TUAV) platoon.  Under the Legacy Force structure these combat support units are 
divisional assets that are attached to a division’s subordinate brigades based on mission 
requirements.  Permanently assigning these assets to a brigade combat team greatly 
increases the flexibility of the brigade by reducing its reliance on external units and 
enables it to better integrate combat multipliers into combat operations.   
The second major change to the HBCT is in the organization of the subordinate 
maneuver battalions.  Legacy Force heavy brigades had either two armor battalions and 
one infantry battalion, or two infantry battalions and one armor battalion each with three 
subordinate companies (infantry battalions with three infantry companies, armor 
battalions with three armor companies), and a Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT), a 
HMMWV based asset that was the brigade commander’s primary reconnaissance asset.  
The UA force structure has two balanced maneuver battalions with two infantry and two 
armor companies each, and an armed reconnaissance squadron that is capable of 
conducting traditional cavalry missions of zone, route, and area reconnaissance.  Each 
maneuver battalion also has an engineer company, a brigade asset under the Legacy 
Force structure, and the maneuver companies have organic Small Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (SUAV).26  This change gives the BCTs an organically combined arms 
capability, and they do not need to rely as heavily on the brigade to provide additional 





                                                 
26 The SUAV system is the Raven-B UAV, a short duration (80 minutes), limited range, and low 
altitude system that is designed to give squads and platoons real-time intelligence in a focused area.  





                      
 
Figure 5.   HBCT Maneuver Battalion Organization27 
 
The armed reconnaissance battalion is the third maneuver unit in the HBCT and 
its existence is recognition of the need to improve the ISR capability of the brigade.  The 
armed recon squadron consists of three cavalry troops, each with two scout platoons, a 
heavy mortar section, a Combat Observation and Lasing Team (COLT), as well as 
SUAVs at the troop level.  While the squadron has replaced the third maneuver battalion 
and lacks the combat power of a maneuver battalion, it increases the brigade’s ability to 
gather intelligence and gives the commander the ability to fight for information, a 
traditional cavalry role.  Figure 6 shows the armed reconnaissance squadron’s 
organization. 
                                                 
27 Heavy Brigade Combat Team (Ch 8), Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Vol 1, Version 
1.0, Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Task Force Modularity, Fort Monroe, 
Virginia, October 2004, 8-4.   
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Figure 6.   HBCT Armed Reconnaissance Squadron Organization28 
 
The final significant change to the HBCT organization is in the Brigade Support 
Battalion.  As in the Legacy Force, the BSB provides maintenance, logistic, 
transportation, and medical support to all units in the brigade, but unlike the legacy 
brigade the HBCT BSB pushes Forward Support Companies (FSCs) to the maneuver, 
armed reconnaissance, and fires battalions.  The legacy force BSB had an extensive 
maintenance capability, but in order to utilize it battalions evacuated their vehicles to the 
Brigade Support Area (BSA), a large logistics site in the brigade’s rear area.  The HBCT 
reduces the need to evacuate vehicles to the BSA by attaching the FSCs, with significant 
maintenance capability, to the brigade’s five battalions. 
E. THE INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM 
The IBCT is the second type of brigade combat team that reorganize during the 
Army’s transformation process and will standardize infantry brigade force composition 
across the force.  In the Legacy Force there are several different types of infantry units, 
all with different organizations: airborne, air assault, mountain, and standard infantry.  By 
standardizing infantry brigades a RCC will have a greater pool of units to choose from 
                                                 
28 Heavy Brigade Combat Team (Ch 8), Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Vol 1, Version 
1.0, Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Task Force Modularity, Fort Monroe, 
Virginia, October 2004, 8-3. 
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for an operation instead of being limited by brigades that cannot meet the mission 
requirements.  Figure 7 shows the IBCT task organization. 
 
   
Figure 7.   Infantry Brigade Combat Team Organization29 
 
 
Like the HBCT, the IBCT consists of a BSTB, two maneuver battalions, a 
reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, and a BSB.  The IBCT BSTB also consist of 
an MP platoon, an NBC platoon, an Area Network company, and MI company with a 
TUAV platoon, and an engineer company.  The addition of the engineers in the BSTB is 
a change from the HBCT organization that has engineer platoons in the maneuver 
battalions. 
Each of the maneuver battalions have three rifle companies, each with three rifle 
platoons, and a weapons company with four HMMWV-based Anti-tank (AT) and heavy 
machine gun platoons.  Each of the four companies in the battalions are equipped with 
the SUAV system, as in the HBCT.  A significant change to the armed reconnaissance 
squadron from the HBCT is instead of three mounted troops, there are two mounted and                                                  
29 Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Ch 9), Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Vol 1, Version 
1.0, Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Task Force Modularity, Fort Monroe, 
Virginia, October 2004, 9-1. 
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one dismounted reconnaissance troops, giving the brigade an increased reconnaissance 
capability over the Legacy Force infantry brigade.  The firing battalion in the IBCT is 
similar to that of the HBCT, with two firing batteries and a target acquisition platoon, 
though the artillery pieces are 105mm towed systems, as opposed to self-propelled 
155mm systems.  The IBCT’s BSB also provides logistic, maintenance, transportation, 
and medical support to the IBCT, as well as providing FSCs to the maneuver and recon 
battalions.  
F. THE STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM 
The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), the Army’s newest combat 
formation, is designed provide the Army with a rapidly deployable and highly mobile 
capability.  Heavy brigades, while highly lethal and mobile in open terrain are not rapidly 
deployable and have extensive logistical sustainment requirements.  Light brigades, in 
contrast, are very mobile in close terrain and have limited firepower.  The SBCT 
represents a force that is mobile in open and closed terrain, is more survivable than light 
units, and has firepower capabilities that fall between heavy and light units.  “The Stryker 
brigade combat team (SBCT) is designed to be a full spectrum, early entry combat force.  
It has utility in all operational environments against all projected future threats.  It 
possesses significant utility for divisions and corps engaged in a major theater war; 
however, the SBCT is optimized to meet the challenges of smaller-scale 
contingencies.”30 
The SBCT is organized around the M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicle, more 
commonly referred to as the Stryker, which comes in ten versions all derived from the 
same base chassis: M1126 – Infantry Carrier, M1127 – Reconnaissance , M1128 – 
Mobile Gun System, M1129 – Mortar Carrier, M1130 – Commander’s Vehicle, M1131 – 
Fire Support, M1132 - Engineer, M1133 - Medical, M1134 – Anti-tank Guided Missile 
(ATGM), M1135 – NBC Reconnaissance.31  The SBCT is organized with three 
motorized infantry battalions, a cavalry (RSTA) squadron, an artillery battalion, a brigade 
                                                 
30 Preface to FM 3-21.31 The Stryker Brigade Team, Headquarters (Department of the Army: 
Washington D.C., March 2003), xi. 
31 Stryker Armored Vehicle, 10 February 2006; available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/iav.htm; Internet; accessed 12 October 2006. 
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support battalion, an anti-tank company, an engineer company, a signal company, and a 
military intelligence company.  Figure 10 shows the SBCT task organization. 
 
       
Figure 8.   Stryker Brigade Combat Team Organization32 
 
Another unique aspect of the SBCT, specifically within the infantry battalions, is 
four platoon in each company – three infantry and one mobile gun system platoons.  The 
addition of the MGS platoons give individual companies the ability to fight as combined 
arms teams, incorporating dismounted infantry, infantry carrier vehicles, MGS vehicles, 
mortars, and snipers into operations.  As with the HBCT and IBCTs, there is a TUAV 
platoon, though it is assigned to the RSTA squadron, and SUAVs at the company level 
throughout the brigade. 
As this discussion of the BCT organizational changes from the Legacy to the 
Interim Force shows, the majority of the additional ISR capabilities are located at the 
brigade headquarters level of the brigades.  By focusing ISR assets at brigade level, the  
brigade commanders is able to focus assets on his ISR collection plan, but this also limits 
                                                 
32 Overview of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (Ch 1), FM 3-21.31 The Stryker Brigade Team, 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., March 2003, 1-13. 
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the ability of subordinate tactical commanders to conduct ISR operations below brigade 
level as there are no dedicated ISR assets in the maneuver battalions. 
The following chapter will describe the specific ISR systems in the BCTs and 
their effectiveness in varying types of terrain and environments, showing that while there 
are several ISR systems in the BCTs few of them are effective in urban environments and 



































III. BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM ISR ASSETS 
A. ISR OVERVIEW 
This chapter will describe the characteristics and capabilities of the Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets of the Interim Force Brigade Combat 
Teams (BCT).  In conjunction with the previous chapter, the description of the 
organizational changes of the BCTs from the Legacy to the Interim Force, will highlight 
gaps in the ability of the BCTs to conduct ISR.  Specifically, the lack of ISR assets at the 
battalion level limits the brigades’ ability to gather intelligence at the lowest tactical 
level, which is necessary for success in Stability Operations and Support Operations 
(SASO).  Describing the BCT ISR assets in detail will show that a majority of the 
systems are most effective in conventional conflicts or in areas away from urban areas, 
which limit the effectiveness of most of the BCT’s assets. 
The transformation of the U.S. Army from the Legacy to the Interim Force is not 
simply a redesign of units’ organizational structures, but instead an organizational 
redesign focusing on increasing the capability of the units to conduct operations across 
the spectrum of conflict.  One of the most important increases in capability within the 
BCTs is in their ISR33 abilities.  Though the three BCT organization types have different 
structures and capabilities, they all use similar, or identical in some cases, systems and 
thus have similar capabilities 
The first asset that all the BCTs have in common is scouts, soldiers specially 
trained to gather information on the terrain and intelligence on an enemy force.  Scouts 
can be used either in a surveillance role or to conduct reconnaissance.  Within a Heavy 
BCT (HBCT) there are three reconnaissance troops in the Armed Reconnaissance 
squadron, each with two scout platoons, and one scout platoon in each of the two 
combined arms battalions.  The HBCT scout platform is the M3 Cavalry Fighting 
                                                 
33 FM 3-21.31, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, defines ISR as follows:  Intelligence is the product 
resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available 
information concerning foreign countries or areas and information and knowledge about an adversary 
obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.; Surveillance involves continuously 
observing an area to collect information.  Wide-area and focused surveillance provide valuable 
information.; Reconnaissance assets collect information and can validate current intelligence or predictions. 
Reconnaissance units, unlike other units, are designed to collect information.  
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Vehicle, a variant of the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle.  Light BCTs have three 
reconnaissance troops in the reconnaissance squadron, two mounted and one dismounted, 
and one dismounted scout platoon within each of the three infantry battalions.  The 
mounted troops within the reconnaissance squadron are equipped with different High 
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) variants.  The Stryker BCTs 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting, and Acquisition (RSTA) squadron has three 
three-platoon Stryker equipped reconnaissance troops and a surveillance troop, and each 
of the three infantry battalions has one Stryker mounted scout platoon.   
B. SCOUTS 
The individual scouts, all working as part of a cohesive ISR effort, are the best 
sensor on the battlefield, with specific systems simply enhancing their ability to gather 
intelligence on enemy forces.  Scouts are effective in conventional operations in finding 
the enemy, determining the enemy’s composition, and determining the enemy’s 
weaknesses that maneuver units can exploit to their advantage.  Scout formations 
encounter the same difficulty as other conventional forces when operating in an urban 
environment.  They are unable to conduct their ISR operations unseen – a critical 
component of their capability, and are therefore subject to counter-reconnaissance efforts.  
Scouts encounter same difficulty in distinguishing enemy personnel from the civilian 
population.  Finally, the closed nature of urban terrain negates a scout’s stand-off 
observation capabilities and forces him to attain close physical proximity to what he is 
observing or gathering intelligence on. 
C. LRAS3, ITAS, IBAS 
Common to the three Interim Force BCT organizations are the Long Range 
Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3) and Improved Target Acquisition System 
(ITAS) / Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided missile (TOW) for HMMWV 
based units or Improved Bradley Target Acquisition System (IBAS) / TOW for M2 and 
M3 equipped units.  LRAS3 is a “long-range multi-sensor system for the U.S. Army 
scout, providing the real-time ability to detect, recognize, identify and geo-locate distant 
targets.”34  The LRAS3’s primary components are a second-generation Forward Looking 
                                                 
 34 Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System – LRAS3, Raytheon Product Data Sheet, 2006; 
available from 
http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms04_017581.pdf; Internet; 
accessed 27 October 2006. 
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Infra-Red (FLIR) night sight, a global positioning interferometer, a laser range finder, 
and a daylight TV recording system.  This system allows the scout to acquire, identify, 
track, and determine an exact location for anything on the battlefield in excess of 10 
kilometers, and some systems are capable of laser designating targets for aircraft and 
artillery fires.  The primary advantage this system gives the scout is the ability to survey 
the battlefield and identify enemy targets, while remaining out of direct fire range.  The 
LRAS3 is a line of sight (LOS) system and cannot see personnel or vehicles that are 
concealed behind terrain, and its extended range capability can be severely restricted by 
urban terrain. 
                                
Figure 9.   M1114 with a pedestal mounted LRAS335 
 
 
The ITAS / TOW and IBAS / TOW are day / night sight systems for the 
HMMWV and M3 mounted TOW system.  The ITAS and IBAS are both second-
generation FLIR sights like the LRAS3 and also have laser range finders, but have a 
shorter surveillance range than the LRAS3.  Both systems allow the TOW gunner to 
observe well beyond the TOW’s maximum range of 4.5 km, though both are also LOS 
systems and subject to the same degradation due to terrain and urban environments as the 
LRAS3. 
 
                                                 
 35 Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System – LRAS3, Raytheon Product Data Sheet, 2006; 
available from 
http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms04_017581.pdf; Internet; 
accessed 27 October 2006. 
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D. BAIS, REMBASS-II 
BCT scouts are also equipped with the Battlefield Anti-Intrusion System (BAIS) / 
AN/PRS-9 and the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Surveillance System – II 
(REMBASS-II).  These systems respectively detect seismic, acoustic and seismic, 
acoustic, magnetic, and infrared signatures.  They are remote systems that can detect 
vibration, sound and other environmental changes out to 350 meters, and serve to 
enhance defensive positions and force protection measures.36  BAIS and REMBASS-II 
systems will have a reduced effectiveness in urban terrain due to the large amount of 
personnel and vehicle traffic associated with towns and cities. 
E. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY ISR ASSETS 
The next significant ISR capabilities that the BCTs possess are organized within 
the Military Intelligence (MI) company.  The MI companies (one per BCT) consist of the 
following platoons :an Analysis and Integration (A&I) Platoon, a Ground Collection 
Platoon, and a Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) Platoon.  The A&I platoon 
consists of a Situation and Target Development squad, an ISR Requirements squad, and a 
Common Ground Station squad.  The Ground Collection Platoon’s assets are a Prophet 
Control squad who are dedicated to operating a Prophet AN/MLQ-40 (V)3 Multi-Sensor 
SIGINT System, a Measures and Signals Intelligence (MASINT) squad that operates 
Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) and REMBASS-II systems, and three Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT) sections.  The TUAV platoon consists of four Shadow-200 
UAVs, a launch and recovery section, and a system control section. 
The primary system that the A&I platoon uses is the AN/TSQ-179 Joint 
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Common Ground Station (JCGS).  
The JCGS is does not fulfill an ISR collection function, but instead “provides support to 
Army field commanders by simultaneously receiving, processing, displaying, 
manipulating, storing, retrieving, and disseminating information to intelligence, fire 
support and command and control elements from Brigade to Echelons Above Corps 
                                                 
 36 BAIS / AN/PRS-9 – Battlefield Anti-Intrusion System, L-3 Communications Systems – East 
Website, 10 March 2004; available from http://www.l-3com.com/cs-east/pdf/bais.pdf; Internet; accessed 02 
November 2006, and REMBASS-II / AN/GSR-8 (v) – Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System – II, 
L-3 Communications Systems –East Website, 10 March 2004; available from http://www.l-3com.com/cs-
east/pdf/rembassii.pdf; Internet; accessed 02 November 2006.  
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(EAC).”37  The CGS allows the BCT to receive information from JTARS E-8A aircraft 
(Moving Target Indicators, Fixed Target Indicator, Synthetic Aperture Radar), AH-64 
Apaches MTI, UAV data and imagery, and other strategic and national-level assets, then 
analyze the information, and send it a variety of other command and control, intelligence, 
and artillery systems.   
The Ground Collection Platoon’s primary systems are the AN/MLQ-40 (V)3 
Prophet, AN/PPS-5D Ground Surveillance Radar, and three four-man HUMINT Teams.  
The Prophet system is a signals intelligence and electronic warfare platform with the 
primary mission to “electronically map radio frequency (RF) emitters on the battlefield 
from 20 MHz (High Frequency/HF) to 2000 MHz (Super High Frequency/SHF).”38  The 
Prophet system can provide a Line of Bearing (LOB) to an enemy emitter, and with 
multiple systems can triangulate an emitter’s location.  Prophet is also capable of 
conducting Electronic Attack (EA) against a variety of emitters, effectively jamming their 
ability to transmit, and intercept tactical voice communications.  The Prophet is a LOS 
system and is subject to degradation due to terrain and urban areas.  An enemy force 
operating in urban areas will still be subject to having their electronic signals collected by 
the Prophet, but can use low-power and short range systems to limit the Prophet’s  
effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
 37 AN/TSQ-179 Joint STARS Common Ground Station (CGS), FAS Intelligence Resource Program 
Website, 26 January 2000; available from http://www.fas.org/irp/program/process/jstars-gsm.htm; Internet; 
accessed 02 November 2006. 
 38 AN/MLQ-40 Prophet, Global Security.org Website, 26 April 2005; available from 
www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/prophet.htm; Internet; accessed 01 November 2006. 
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Figure 10.   AN/MLQ-40 Prophet System39 
 
Within the BCTs there are multiple AN/PPS-5D Ground Surveillance Radars, 
both in the MI company and the Armed Reconnaissance Squadron (HBCT and IBCT) / 
RSTA Squadron (Stryker BCT).  The GSR is a man-portable system that can detect, 
identify, determine a location for, and track personnel targets out to 10 km and vehicle 
targets out to 20km.  Like other LOS systems, the GSR is susceptible to terrain masking 
and has limited effectiveness in urban terrain and is best suited for open terrain in 
conventional conflicts to detect enemy personnel and vehicles, as it cannot distinguish 
between friend or foe. 
                              
Figure 11.   AN/PPS-5D Ground Surveillance Radar40 
                                                 
 39 L3 Communications, Titan Group Website; available at http://www.titan.com/products-
services/abstract.html?docID=382; Internet; accessed 16 November 2006. 
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The final components of the Ground Collection Platoon are the three HUMINT 
teams.  Each are composed of three HUMINT collectors and one Counter-intelligence 
(CI) agent.41  The three teams (four in the Stryker BCT) can be used to focus on the 
brigade collection plan to answer the brigade commander’s Priority Intelligence 
Requirements (PIR), or be task organized to the maneuver battalions and integrated into 
their respective collection plans.  These soldiers are trained to conduct the following 
HUMINT collection and reconnaissance missions: civil-military operations support, civil 
disturbance support, local operational data collection, debriefing and interrogation, elicit 
information from the population, interrogate EPWs and detainees, document exploitation, 
and source screening.42  This capability vastly improves the BCTs ability to conduct 
reconnaissance operations in an urban environment, though the BCT’s effectiveness will 
be directly affected by the number of linguists / interpreters that are available to the BCT: 
a lack of language capability in a non-English speaking country will make the HUMINT 
collector and CI agent’s unique capabilities largely irrelevant.  Scouts traditionally 
observe and report on ‘what’ is happening on the battlefield, and the addition of the 
HUMINT teams further expands a commander’s view of the battlefield environment by 
attempting to answer ‘why’ a particular event is occurring. 
F. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 
The final major addition to the BCTs capability is the incorporation of Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) into the BCT organization.  There are two types of UAVs in the 
BCTs, the RQ-11B Raven-B and the RQ-7B Shadow-200.  The Army’s goal in the 
Future Force is to utilize four classes of UAVs at the brigade and below, from 1 hour 
duration vehicles used by individual soldiers to 18-24 hour duration vehicles at the 
brigade level.  Class I UAVs will be Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL), weigh 
approximately 15 pounds, operate effectively in urban and heavily wooded terrain, have a 
                                                 
40 Product Manager, Robotics and Unmanned Sensors website; available from 
https://peoiewswebinfo.monmouth.army.mil/portal_sites/IEWS_Public/rus/pps5d.htm; Internet; accessed 
16 November 2006. 
41 In the RSTA Squadron of the Stryker BCT there is one HUMINT collector per six-man squad, 
further increasing the ability to collect HUMINT at the lowest tactical level possible. 
42MAJ Brad C. Dostal and CPT Christine McCormick, “Preempting the Enemy – HUMINT’s Role in 
Multidimensional Reconnaissance within the IBCT;” available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_01-18_ch4.htm; Internet; accessed 30 
October 2006. 
32 
flight duration of one hour, and provide reconnaissance and surveillance information to 
the lowest tactical level.  Class II UAVs will also be  VTOL aircraft, have up to a two 
hour endurance, and provide the company commander with day, night, and adverse 
weather reconnaissance and surveillance capability, as well as the ability to integrate with 
other air and non-line of sight (NLOS) systems.  Class III UAVs will be a maneuver 
battalion asset and provide the same capabilities as the CL I and II systems, as well as 
serving as a communications relay, mine detection, and meteorological survey platform.  
Class IV systems will be long-duration, persistent surveillance (18-24 hours) assets that 
provide the brigade commander with all the capabilities of CL I-III systems, in addition 
to electronic surveillance and the ability to cross-cue other brigade sensor systems.43 
The Shadow-200 TUAV platoon, a Class III UAV system, is a complete system 
composed of four Shadow-200 UAVs, two Ground Control Stations (GCS), two Ground 
Data Terminals (GDT), a Portable Ground Control Station (PGCS), a Portable Ground 
Data Terminal (PGDT), 4 air vehicles, a Ground Data Terminal, a portable Ground 
Control Station, and four Remote Video Terminals.  The system also includes six 
HMMWVs with trailers to transport the system’s equipment, and 22 personnel to operate 
and maintain the system.44 
                
Figure 12.   RQ-7 Shadow45                                                  
43 Future Combat System (FCS) Fact Files, U.S. Army Website, 03 November 2006; available at 
http://www.army.mil/fcs/index.html; Internet; accessed 08 November 2006.  
44 Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) Concept of Operations (CONOPs), 22 March 2000; 
available from www.fas.org/irp/programs/collect/docs/TUAV-CONOPS.htm; Internet; accessed 31 August 
2006. 
45 RQ-7 Shadow; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RQ-7_Shadow; Internet; accessed 17 
November 2006. 
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Both the IBCT and HBCT have one TUAV platoon in the MI Company, while the 
SBCT has one TUAV platoon in the surveillance troop of the armed reconnaissance 
squadron.  The TUAV platoon, and the Shadow-200, is the “ground maneuver 
commander’s primary day/night, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 
(RSTA) system”46 and can assist his efforts to increase his situational awareness of 
enemy forces, provide a target acquisition capability, conduct a battle damage 
assessment, and enhance the commander’s understanding of the battlefield environment.  
The mission of the TUAV platoon “is to provide a real-time, responsive day and night 
imagery surveillance and reconnaissance capability to support SA [situational 
awareness], TA [target acquisition], and BDA [battle damage assessment] to brigade and 
below units.”47  The Shadow aircraft and its sensor payload are both capable of 
conducting preprogrammed or operator-controlled operations.  
The most important characteristics of the Shadow-200 are its operating altitude, 
flight duration, payload, and the range that it can operate away from its control station.  
The Shadow’s maximum operating altitude is approximately 15,000 feet AGL, though it 
is most often operated lower than 10,000 feet.  This relatively high altitude capability 
allows the Shadow to conduct surveillance without presenting an audio signal to targets 
on the ground, preventing targets from knowing that they are being observed.48  The 
Shadow’s flight duration is approximately five hours, giving it the ability to loiter over a 
target area, provide persistent surveillance capability to the brigade commander.  A 
payload capacity of 60 lbs. allows the Shadow to carry a variety of sensors.  Currently, 
the Shadow’s payloads consist of Electro-optical / Infrared video sensors, laser 
designators, and a Radar Frequency Interferometer (RFI) that can determine grid 
locations for ground targets.  The variety of payloads that the Shadow can carry give the 
BCTs the ability to observe a location, find an enemy target, determine the target’s 
location, and designate the target for attack by other systems – artillery, rotary, and fixed 
                                                 
46 Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) Concept of Operations (CONOPs), 22 March 2000; 
available from www.fas.org/irp/programs/collect/docs/TUAV-CONOPS.htm; Internet; accessed 31 August 
2006. 
47 FMI 3-04.155, Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations, (Headquarters, Department of the 
Army: Washington, D.C.), April 2006, 1-9. 
48 CW3 Steve Schisler, Raven/SUAV TRADOC Systems Manager – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Systems, “RE: Thesis,” Email to author, 15 November 2006. 
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wing aircraft.  Finally, the Shadow is capable of operating up to 50km away from a GCS, 
as long as the GCS and aircraft can maintain a LOS connection.  This gives the brigade 
the capability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance well away from ground 
operations, allowing U.S. forces to remain out of contact with enemy forces.  
The RQ-11 Raven-B, a CL II UAV, is fielded to Army units as a system 
consisting of three Raven aircraft, three different payload sensors (1xElectro-optical and 
2xInfrared), a remote video terminal (RVT), and the unit’s ground control unit (GCU).49  
It is a man-portable system providing near real-time (NRT) day and night surveillance to 
platoons and companies.50 
                                       
Figure 13.   RQ-11 Raven 
 
Within the HBCT and IBCT there are a total of 15 three-aircraft Raven-B 
systems: three per reconnaissance squadron,  four per maneuver battalion, two per 
artillery battalion, one in each support battalion, and one system in the special troops 
battalion.  The SBCT also has 15 Raven systems, with one in the brigade Headquarters 
and Headquarters Company (HHC), three systems per infantry battalion, four systems in 
the RSTA squadron, and one in the artillery battalion.51    
                                                 
49 Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FMI 3.04-155 Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations, 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army: Washington, D.C.), April 2006, pages 2-10 to 2-13. 
50 A Naval Postgraduate School thesis titled “The Raven Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (SUAV), 
Investigating Potential Dichotomies Between Doctrine and Practice,” written by MAJ Glenn Jenkins and 
MAJ William Snodgrass, Jr. (30 June 2005), provides a detailed analysis of the doctrinal and actual uses of 
the Raven UAV, and describes the acquisition processes used to field the system. 
51 Steve Schisler, CW3, Raven/SUAV TSM-UAVS, “Modular Forces – Draft Working Papers” 
Powerpoint Presentation, November 2006, Email to author, 15 November 2006.  
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The characteristics of the Raven-B that make it an effective ISR platform are its 
battery powered motor, small size, and payload capability.  The Raven has a battery 
powered motor and propeller, giving it a 60-90 minute flight duration and low observable 
audio signature.  This enables the Raven to operate at altitudes up to 1000 feet and have a 
low probability of detection.  The Raven is also a small aircraft with a wingspan of 4.5 
feet, further contributing to its ability to remain undetected.  The Raven has three 
interchangeable payloads – one electro-optical, one side looking infrared, and one 
forward looking infrared – that allow it operate day or night.52 
To date, the manufacturer of the Shadow-200, AAI Corporation, has delivered 51 
systems to the Army, and these systems have flown over 28,000 missions with over 
110,000 flight hours, in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF / 
OEF).53  Similarly, the Raven has flown over 15,000 missions totally over 18,000 flight 
hours in support of OIF and OEF.54  With the extensive use of UAVs in combat, Army 
force are beginning to develop Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and doctrine 
for their use.  FMI 3-04.115, Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operation, provides 
doctrinal guidance on UAV employment, but focuses exclusively on UAV support to 
conventional operations. 
G. UAV EMPLOYMENT 
In Iraq and Afghanistan, soldiers are using the Shadow and Raven for a wide 
range of mission from traditional reconnaissance missions to supervising Iraqi National 
Guard mission performance.  Specifically, the Shadow and Raven systems are in use 
conducting reconnaissance prior to and during cordon and search and raid operations, 
conducting area reconnaissance, route reconnaissance, convoy escort and security 
missions, IED emplacement detection, observing Iraqi forces checkpoints and patrols, 
                                                 
52 Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FMI 3.04-155 Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations, 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army: Washington, D.C.), April 2006, page 2-11. 
53 “AAI Corporation Receives Unmanned Systems Contract,” Spacewar Website, 17 October 2006; 
available from 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/AAI_Corporation_Receives_Unmanned_Systems_Contracts_999.html; 
Internet; accessed 16 November 2006. 
54 “AeroVironments Raven Achieves Production Operational Milestones,” Spacewar Website, 16 
March 2006; available from 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/AeroVironments_Raven_Achieves_Production_Operational_Milestones.
html; Internet; accessed 16 November 2006. 
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counter-mortar operations, initial targeting of enemy forces, and Forward Operating Base 
(FOB) security missions.55  Both systems are demonstrating the effectiveness of UAVs at 
the tactical level, in missions ranging from combat operations to stability and support 
operations.  UAVs are also proving to be the only BCT systems that can effectively 
conduct ISR operations in densely populated urban environments, allowing the BCT to 
collect information that it otherwise would not be able to collect.   
The Shadow and Raven systems, while both in use within the Interim Force 
BCTs, were not both originally part of the Army’s transformation plan.  The TUAV 
Shadow platoon has been a part of the process from the origins of the transformation 
process and has proceeded through the new Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development Process, the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) latest acquisition process.  
Conversely, the Raven’s integration into the transformation process is based on an 
Operational Needs Statement from commanders who wanted an “over-the-hill, around-
the-corner capability.”56  The requirements for a system that could provide the needed 
capabilities originated in 2001 during Operation Enduring Freedom, and it was fielded 








                                                 
55 CW3 Steve Schisler, Raven/SUAV TRADOC Systems Manager – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Systems, “Shadow 200 TUAV Baghdad TTPs and Issues” and “Raven Vignettes, 17 APR 05,”  “RE: 
Thesis,” Email to author, 15 November 2006. 
56 Charles Weirauch, “Playing the UAV Hand,” MS&T – The International Defence Training Journal, 
February 2006, 40. 
57 The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force is a means to assess emerging requirements of combatant 
commanders and to suggest solutions that can be implemented rapidly.  Beyond that need, solutions must 
be evaluated for their possible contribution to the future force. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
As the largest component of the Army, conventional forces are regularly called to 
participate in conflicts that are not conventional in nature.  These forces need to be able 
to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, from high intensity conflict to 
peacekeeping operations and all operations in between.  Critical to the success of 
conventional forces in any conflict is their ability to conduct Intelligence gathering, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to first see the battlefield environment and then 
conduct operations that influence that environment.  In conventional conflicts there are 
significant national and strategic assets that collect, analyze, process, and disseminate 
intelligence to forces for use in the field.  These assets are ill suited to gathering the real-
time intelligence that conventional forces need to be successful in unconventional 
conflicts, specifically counterinsurgency and urban operations.  In the Army’s 
transformation from the Legacy Force to the Interim Force, and eventually the Future 
Force, there are significant additions to the modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) that 
specifically address the BCTs’ ISR capability, both organizationally and through the 
addition of specific ISR systems.  
Organizationally, the Heavy BCTs have changed from having three combat arms 
battalions to having two combined arms battalions and an armed reconnaissance 
squadron, the Light BCTs maintained their three infantry battalions and added a 
reconnaissance squadron, and the Stryker BCTs, a completely new Army organization, 
are organized around three infantry battalions and a cavalry squadron.  The 
transformation plan also adds a military intelligence company to each BCT, and 
incorporates the Raven-B UAV to the maneuver companies in the combined arms and 
infantry battalions, giving them an increased ISR capability at the lowest tactical level.  
In Legacy Force brigades the only dedicated ISR assets were a brigade reconnaissance 
troop and three scout platoons, one in each of the maneuver battalions.  Converting a 
maneuver battalion into a reconnaissance squadron and adding a military intelligence 
company in the BCTs reflects the need for increased capability at the brigade level to 
generate tactical level intelligence and conduct more robust surveillance and 
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reconnaissance missions.  The addition of reconnaissance squadrons in the BCTs gives 
the BCTs hundreds of additional scouts.  Despite the additional reconnaissance 
capabilities of the BCTs, both at the brigade and company level, there is an ISR gap 
within the combined arms battalions that the organizational redesign did not address.  The 
HBCT combined arms battalions, LBCT infantry battalions, and SBCT infantry 
battalions do not have a battalion-level dedicated, improved ISR capability over the 
Legacy Force battalions. 
To augment the organizational changes in the BCTs, the Army is adding new, and 
increasing the numbers of existing, ISR systems within the BCTs.  The addition of 
Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR), Long Range Acquisition Scout Surveillance System 
(LRAS3), Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) and Improved Bradley 
Acquisition System (IBAS), Remote Battlefield Surveillance System (REMBASS-II), 
Common Ground Station (CGS), Prophet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) system, and the 
Shadow-200 and Raven-B Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) augment the BCT 
organizational changes and enhance their ISR capabilities.  These systems are 
predominantly organized within the MI company and the reconnaissance squadrons, and 
do not significantly enhance the combined arms and infantry battalion’s ISR capabilities.  
A majority of these systems are limited in that they are Line of Sight (LOS) systems and 
are significantly degraded by rolling and wooded terrain, as well as urban environments.   
Organizing the BCTs in this manner provides several advantages over Legacy 
Force units.  First, regional commanders can tailor the forces that they need to 
accomplish their missions.  With commanders able to select individual brigades instead 
of entire divisions, the brigades would lose their access to traditional divisional assets like 
Military Police (MP), Chemical, and Military Intelligence (MI).  As such, the BCTs 
contain small elements of these units, increasing their flexibility and ability to operate 
independent of divisional support and augmentation.  The Interim Force BCTs also all 
contain organic reconnaissance units, allowing them to conduct the conventional 
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions normally conducted by divisions.  




to maintain dominance over conventional enemies.  Organizing the BCTs as they are in 
the Interim Force improves their ability to operate independently while retaining their 
conventional combat power.   
“In urban operations, the one commodity a close-combat soldier or Marine 
demands most is knowledge of the enemy waiting around the street corner in ambush.”58 
The Shadow and Raven UAVs are the only systems in the BCT organization that can 
effectively provide this level of intelligence in a variety of environments, in a variety of 
conflict types. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To capitalize on the effectiveness of the Shadow and Raven UAVs, and the 
unprecedented ability they give commanders to see aspects of the battlefield that were 
previously unavailable to them, the author recommends incorporating the Shadow 
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) platoon into each maneuver and 
reconnaissance battalion and squadron in the BCTs.  As BCTs are currently using the 
Raven-B at the company level, the author will make no recommendations regarding their 
implementation or operation.  By adding TUAV platoons to each of the maneuver units 
in the BCTs, the brigade will have ISR capabilities at all organizational levels – brigade, 
battalion, company, and platoon.  Providing ISR capabilities throughout the depth of the 
BCT organizations ensures that “[a]ll operations [can] be shaped by carefully considered 
actionable intelligence gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible levels and 
disseminated and distributed throughout the force.”59   
Battalion is the lowest recommended implementation for the TUAV platoon 
because battalions have sufficient staffs to integrate UAVs into a comprehensive ISR 
plan, and monitor and control their use during operations.  Company level units do not 
possess a staff beyond the commander, executive officer, first sergeant, and a few 
soldiers, and therefore have a limited capability to plan and supervise complex combined 
arms missions.  Companies are instead primarily the executors of, and key components 
of, combined arms missions that are planned at brigade and battalion level.  Incorporating 
                                                 
58 MG (ret.) Robert H. Scales, “Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View,” Military Review, January –
February 2006, 11. 
59 Eliot Cohen and others, eds., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” 
Military Review, March-April 2006, 50.  
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TUAV platoons at the company level will make a company commander’s job 
unnecessarily complex, and force him to focus more on the planning and controlling the 
employment of UAVs and less on the actions of his subordinate combat platoons. 
Battalions, conversely, have significant dedicated staffs whose sole purpose is to 
plan and supervise the execution of combined arms operations.  By adding TUAV 
platoons to maneuver battalions the TUAV platoon leader and warrant officer will 
become members of the battalion staffs, and be able to provide their expertise and 
experience in integrating UAVs into battalion operations.  This will enable the battalion 
to exploit the capabilities of the TUAV platoon while allowing company commanders to 
focus on employing their platoons.     
As currently organized, maneuver battalions in the BCTs have no improved ISR 
capability over the Legacy Force battalions, limiting their ability to conduct ISR missions 
in counterinsurgency and urban environments.  As discussed in Chapter I, success in 
counterinsurgency operations, specifically when insurgents embed themselves into a 
civilian population, requires a capability to observe the population and gather intelligence 
on the insurgents without influencing their behaviors.  Chapter III shows that UAVs are 
the only ISR asset in the BCTs that provide an observation capability without directly 
influencing the behavior of the target.  Having a single TUAV platoon in each brigade 
limits the ability of BCTs to conduct persistent ISR operations in more than one location 
at a time.  Current and past operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have had brigades 
responsible for large areas of operation (AO), often encompassing significant urban 
areas.  Within these AOs, subordinate battalions will each be responsible for contiguous 
sectors, resulting in brigade AOs that encompass several battalion AOs.  One TUAV 
platoon per BCT forces the brigade commander to prioritize where to employ the 
surveillance capabilities of the Shadow-200, where one TUAV platoon per battalion 
would allow a BCT’s subordinate battalions to conduct simultaneous UAV surveillance 





C. DOTMLPF CONSIDERATIONS 
The following section will address the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, 
Leadership and Education, and Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) considerations for 
incorporating the Shadow TUAV platoon into maneuver battalions with the Interim Force 
BCTs.  
1. Doctrine  
To effectively incorporate UAVs into battalions there needs to be a sound 
doctrinal template for employing them across the spectrum of conflict.  The current Field 
Manual that covers UAV operations, FMI (Interim) 3-04.115, does not adequately 
address all operations in which UAVs can be utilized.  FMI 3-04.155, Chapter 5 – 
Unmanned Aircraft System Employment, covers reconnaissance and surveillance, 
security operations, unmanned aircraft system targeting, manned-unmanned team 
operations, and personnel recovery missions, but does not address UAV operations in 
urban areas or how UAVs can affect the variety of missions encompassed by Stability 
Operations and Support Operations.60  The use of Raven and Shadow UAVs in 
Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom are providing a wealth of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) in the area of UAV capabilities and employment.  These TTPs should 
be transformed into doctrinal templates prior to the fielding of the Future Force, which 
will be use unmanned systems much more intensively than the Legacy or Interim Forces.     
2. Organization  
The Army’s BCTs have set personnel limits with specific allocations for number 
of personnel assigned, and whether or not a position is filled directly affects the Army’s 
personnel replacement system.  The personnel system is also a zero sum game – once 
personnel limits are set, adding a position requires removing a position from elsewhere in 
the organization.  To add a TUAV platoon to a battalion requires removing 22 positions 
from another part of the battalion.  Additional studies should determine what areas of the 
battalion organization can sustain losses of personnel to enable adding the 22 TUAV 
platoon personnel.   
                                                 
60 FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, list the various SASO missions as Foreign 
Internal Defense, Peace Operations (Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement), Stability Operations (Security 
Assistance, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Support to Insurgency, Support to Counterdrug Operations, 
Combating Terrorism, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Arms Control, Show of Force), and Support 
Operations (Domestic Support Operations, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance). 
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3. Training   
To accommodate the additional personnel requirements of 22 trained personnel 
per combined arms and infantry battalion, the Military Intelligence School at Fort 
Huachuca, AZ, will have to expand it ability to train additional UAV operators.  This will 
require an expansion of all aspects of UAV operator training, including Basic Training, 
the Non-commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), and the Officer Basic 
Course (OBC).   
4. Material   
To procure the additional TUAV platoons the Army will have to alter its budget 
projections, and allocate an approximately $10 million per platoon.61  By adding at least 
two TUAV platoons to each BCT that has one platoon, the budgeting necessary to 
purchase the additional platoons will at least triple the previous budget allocations for the 
system.  Additional UAV platoons in all BCT maneuver battalions will also require a 
long term investment to account for additional operators and their training, as well as 
maintenance and replacement costs for the UAV systems throughout their lifecycle. 
5. Leadership and Education   
Simply adding a new system to an organization does not ensure that the system 
will increase the effectiveness of the organization.  Trained personnel, specifically those 
in leadership positions that will be planning the system’s use and controlling its 
implementation, are essential.  To ensure that the Army’s leaders know how to 
incorporate UAVs into their operations, the Armor and Infantry Schools should integrate 
UAV capabilities and employment training into all non-commissioned officer and officer 
education systems.  
6. Personnel and Facilities   
To support the additional aircraft in the BCTs it will be necessary to expand the 
support personnel and facilities at stateside Army posts.  This includes, but is not limited 
to, hanger and maintenance facilities at Army airfields, additional training areas that 
support UAV employment, and contractor support facilities.     
 
                                                 
61 Matthew Swibel, “Learning to Fly,” Forbes.com Website, 30 October 2006; available from 
http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2006/1030/184.html; Internet; accessed 13 November 2006. 
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